Judging Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency by Sprenger, Charles
280
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2015, 105(5): 280–285
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151086
Judging Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency†
By Charles Sprenger*
Models of dynamically inconsistent deci-
sion-making are among the most prom-
inent in behavioral economics (Laibson 
1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Gul and 
Pesendorfer 2001; Fudenberg and Levine 2006). 
Such models capture the tensions of temptation 
and self-control in elegant formulation, deliver-
ing intuitive deviations from the standard model 
of intertemporal choice, and providing novel 
prescriptions for policymakers. In this brief 
paper, I attempt to judge the experimental liter-
ature on dynamic inconsistency, identifying key 
challenges and innovations, and providing one 
view as to how the literature may evolve.
A notably large body of experimental 
research investigates the predictions of dynam-
ically inconsistent models (for a summary to 
the early 2000s, see Frederick, Loewenstein, 
and O’Donoghue 2002). As such, the review 
provided here cannot be comprehensive. A fur-
ther limitation in scope is that though I have 
attempted to explore broadly, my review and 
judgments may be somewhat tilted toward lab-
oratory, as opposed to field, experiments in this 
domain.
The core of the experimental literature on 
dynamic inconsistency has two key features. 
First, the body of research largely identifies 
preferences from time-dated monetary choices. 
Second, experimental designs focus primarily 
on key predictions of dynamically inconsistent 
models rather than explicit dynamic inconsisten-
cies. I elaborate on these two points, discussing 
the challenges they pose for identifying models 
in question, and recent attempts to rise to these 
challenges.
I. Time Dated Monetary Payments
Time dated monetary payments have been 
the norm in experimental research on inter-
temporal choice (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue 2002). Such experiments using 
choices between sooner and later monetary 
rewards have, until recently, generated robust 
evidence in support of dynamically inconsistent 
models. At least three assumptions are required 
for such choices to be informative for intertem-
poral preferences. First, subjects must fail to 
think of their experimental choices in the context 
of their external borrowing and lending opportu-
nities. In the presence of arbitrage opportunities, 
choices over monetary payments should reveal 
nothing about preferences (Cubitt and Read 2007; 
Chabris, Laibson, and Schuldt 2008).1 These 
arbitrage implications must be assumed away.2 
Second, akin to narrow-bracketing, subjects must 
hold fixed or ignore their external consumption 
choices when making experimental decisions. 
While researchers are able to vary experimen-
tal payments, subjects potentially make choices 
over both these payments and nonexperimental 
background consumption. It must be assumed 
that individuals do not adjust their background 
consumption in response to payment, and that it 
is sufficiently stable to limit confounding iden-
tified preferences. Third, transactions costs and 
payment reliability must not influence subject 
choices. Differential transactions costs or pay-
ment reliability through time can generate appar-
ent dynamic  inconsistencies. As such, it must 
1 This point has been thoughtfully taken into account in 
some studies. For example, Harrison, Lau, and Williams 
(2002) explicitly account for potential arbitrage in their 
calculations of individual discount rates by measuring indi-
vidual borrowing and saving rates and incorporating these 
values in estimation. 
2 I am aware of only one paper experimentally testing 
these arbitrage implications, Coller and Williams (1999), 
who present experimental subjects with a fully articulated 
arbitrage argument and external interest rate information and 
document only a small treatment effect. 
* Rady School of Management and Department of 
Economics, University of California San Diego, 9500 
Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA (e-mail: csprenger@ucsd.
edu). With thanks to Jim Andreoni, Doug Bernheim, Yoram 
Halevy, Ted O’Donoghue, and Stephan Meier for helpful 
conversations leading to this draft.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151086 to visit 
the article page for additional materials and author disclo-
sure statement.
VOL. 105 NO. 5 281DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY EVIDENCE
be assumed that subject responses reflect only 
their time preferences and not their assessment 
of experimenter reliability.
Each of these assumptions poses a challenge 
for experimental identification. If they are not 
satisfied, then the substantial evidence in favor 
of dynamically inconsistent models from time-
dated monetary choices may be confounded. 
Exploring such a possibility and robustifying 
the evidence in light of this critique have been 
topics of recent interest.
First, for arbitrage opportunities, Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012a) provide one experimen-
tal innovation in this vein. They introduce the 
Convex Time Budget (CTB), wherein subjects 
allocate an experimental budget of money 
across sooner and later dates. One implication 
of arbitrage is that subject responses should 
lie primarily at corner solutions, allocating the 
entire budget to either the sooner or later date 
depending on the interest rate.3 The researcher 
should thus uncover a linear utility function, 
with sooner and later payments serving as per-
fect substitutes. This is indeed what Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012a) find, with a preponder-
ance of corner solutions and close to linear 
utility estimates.4 These findings have been 
reproduced in several samples with money 
(Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b; Augenblick, 
Niederle, and Sprenger 2013; Andreoni, Kuhn, 
and Sprenger 2013), and may hint at the pres-
ence of such arbitraging behavior. Interestingly, 
with larger relative stakes in developing country 
environments, Giné et al. (2010) show substan-
tially more interior CTB allocations. The prev-
alence of corner solutions in such CTB studies 
may be informative for the extent to which mon-
etary discounting studies are subject to arbitrage 
concerns and hence, can be relied on to identify 
time preferences.
Second, for external consumption oppor-
tunities, a set of projects has recently begun 
to recognize the importance of background 
consumption for identifying time preferences. 
3 It may be easier to test this implication of arbitrage 
rather than collect precise information on borrowing and 
lending opportunities for each subject. However, the com-
bination would be of clear value as even without arbitrag-
ing the experiment a subject with linear preference would 
exhibit only corner solutions. 
4 Nonetheless an important minority of subjects exhibit 
interior solutions such that significant utility curvature is 
found on average. 
Andersen et al. (2008) provide an initial inves-
tigation, estimating time preferences with back-
ground  consumption fixed at a survey measure 
of average daily consumption. Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012a) demonstrate the sensitivity 
of identified preferences to changing assump-
tions on background consumption, indicating 
that discounting parameters can vary dramat-
ically depending on the level of background 
consumption assumed.5 Several recent efforts 
explore empirically the possibility that changing 
economic situation, and hence changing back-
ground consumption, affect estimated time pref-
erences and dynamic inconsistencies. Dean and 
Sautmann (2014) provide evidence from Mali 
that expenditure shocks are linked to measured 
intertemporal preferences and Carvalho, Meier, 
and Wang (2014) show a clear link between 
payday timing and hallmarks of dynamic incon-
sistency. In contrast, Meier and Sprenger (forth-
coming) show limited correlations between 
changes in financial situation and instability in 
measured preferences. Though more research 
in this vein is likely necessary, a reading of the 
literature would suggest a clear possibility for 
background consumption, in practice, to present 
a confound for identifying time preferences and 
dynamic inconsistency.
Third, for payment reliability, a valid ques-
tion is whether subjects do indeed believe that 
all intertemporal payments will be received 
with equal probability. This point was originally 
raised by Thaler (1981, p. 207) who, when con-
sidering the possibility of using incentivized 
monetary payments in intertemporal choice 
experiments noted “Real money experiments 
would be interesting but seem to present enor-
mous tactical problems. (Would subjects believe 
they would get paid in five years?)” Thaler’s 
suspicion has been validated in recent work, 
demonstrating that when transactions costs 
and payment reliability are closely controlled, 
dynamic inconsistency is quite limited on aggre-
gate (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012a; Giné et 
5 The sensitivity analysis provided by Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012a) is conducted with the maintained assump-
tion of stationary background consumption. They show 
the level of discounting and utility function curvature vary 
dramatically with choice of level, but that estimates of 
 quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters are relatively sta-
ble. If one relinquished stationarity in background consump-
tion, estimates of quasi-hyperbolicity would also likely be 
sensitive. 
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al. 2010; Andreoni, Kuhn, and Sprenger 2013; 
Andersen et al. 2012; Augenblick, Niederle, 
and Sprenger 2013; Carvalho, Meier, and Wang 
2014). Further, when payment risk is added in 
an experimentally  controlled way, nonexpected 
utility risk preferences deliver data patterns 
associated with those of dynamic inconsistency 
(Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b). This indicates 
that researchers should be particularly concerned 
with maximizing payment reliability as findings 
of inconsistency may well be confounded by 
treatment of uncertainty.
Given the challenges inherent to experiments 
with time dated monetary payments, interest 
has turned to identifying dynamically inconsis-
tency using consumption itself. On relatively 
short time scales of a few minutes, Solnick et 
al. (1980) document dynamic inconsistency in 
choices over irritating noises, and McClure et al. 
(2007); Brown, Chua, and Camerer (2009) doc-
ument hallmarks of dynamic inconsistency in 
beverage choices. Such efforts put precise time 
stamps on consumption and avoid issues related 
to risk, background consumption, and arbitrage. 
However, one may worry that the time-scales 
are too short to be predictive for economically 
relevant behaviors. At a larger time interval of 
a week or more, Read and Van Leeuwen (1998) 
identify dynamic inconsistency in the surprise 
reallocation of snack foods, Read, Loewenstein, 
and Kalyanaraman (1999) identify inconsis-
tencies in “highbrow” and “lowbrow” movie 
choices, Sayman and Onculer (2009) document 
inconsistencies in cafe rewards choices (denom-
inated in croissants), Augenblick, Niederle, and 
Sprenger (2013) document dynamic inconsis-
tencies in effort choices, Kaur, Kremer, and 
Mullainathan (2014) demonstrate hallmarks 
of dynamic inconsistency in the money/effort 
trade-offs of data workers, and Carvalho, Meier, 
and Wang (2014) demonstrate hallmarks of 
dynamic inconsistency in the timing of com-
pleting survey questions. Both Augenblick, 
Niederle, and Sprenger (2013) and Carvalho, 
Meier, and Wang (2014) contrast the extent of 
dynamic inconsistency elicited via money and 
consumption, showing limited inconsistencies 
for money and substantially greater inconsis-
tencies in consumption. Research with direct 
consumption has shown compelling support for 
dynamically inconsistent models. However, care 
should be taken in interpreting this evidence 
as some of the issues that plague monetary 
 discounting experiments may well be present in 
these experiments, too.
II. Hallmarks of Dynamic Inconsistency
Clear identification of dynamic inconsis-
tency relies on subjects choosing between 
rewards at time  t and time  t + k at two points 
in time, once at time  s < t and once at time  t . 
Disagreement in these choices is evidence of 
dynamic inconsistency.
Interestingly, much of the conducted labo-
ratory research relies on experimental tests of 
changing patience, rather than dynamic incon-
sistency itself. Two forms of experimental tasks 
have been popularized. The first form asks sub-
jects to choose between a smaller, sooner reward 
at time  0 and a larger, later reward at time  k . 
Subjects are also asked at time 0 the same ques-
tion with times  t > 0 and  t + k . Preferring 
the smaller, sooner reward in one question and 
preferring the larger, later reward in another is 
taken as evidence of changing patience (see, 
for example Coller and Williams 1999; Ashraf 
et al. 2006; Meier and Sprenger 2010). The sec-
ond form uses two delay lengths,  k and  k ′ and 
identifies indifference between a smaller, sooner 
reward at time  0 and larger later rewards at 
times  k and  k ′. The researcher examines whether 
the implied discount rates “paste” together in 
the manner implied by exponential discount-
ing (see, for example, Kirby, Petry, and Bickel 
1999; Giordano et al. 2002).
Though evidence of changing patience may 
imply a violation of the standard model of 
exponential discounting and corresponds to 
predictions of models of dynamic inconsis-
tency, such data patterns could be generated 
by dynamically consistent models. Subjects 
with  time-dependent, but dynamically consis-
tent, discounting parameters could well deliver 
the above-noted data patterns. This should be 
viewed as a critical shortcoming of the experi-
mental literature to date: hallmarks of dynamic 
inconsistency, as opposed to true dynamic 
inconsistencies themselves, comprise the body 
of the literature.
Relatively few studies provide the longitu-
dinal tests necessary to truly identify dynamic 
inconsistency. This point is noted by Halevy 
(2012) and Sayman and Onculer (2009), the lat-
ter of which identifies only three prior longitu-
dinal studies of time inconsistency: Ainslie and 
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Haendel (1983) for monetary choices within 
heroin-addicted subjects; Read, Loewenstein, 
and Kalyanaraman (1999) for “highbrow” and 
“lowbrow” movies between subjects; and Read 
and Van Leeuwen (1998) for snack choices 
within subjects. Another early contribution 
is Solnick et al. (1980). Recent experimental 
advances with longitudinal designs include 
Sayman and Onculer (2009) for cafe rewards 
and money; Halevy (2012) for money; Giné et 
al. (2010) for money; Augenblick, Niederle, 
and Sprenger (2013) for effort and money; 
and Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) for 
fertilizer purchase. Critical among these con-
tributions are Giné et al. (2010) and Halevy 
(2012) who show connections (or lack thereof) 
between changing patience and true dynamic 
inconsistencies.
Another path by which hallmarks of dynamic 
inconsistency are explored is the investigation 
of commitment demand. Under both temptation 
models (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001; Fudenberg 
and Levine 2006) and quasi hyperbolic dis-
counting models with sophistication (Laibson 
1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2001) 
dynamically inconsistent individuals should 
value commitment. One critical contribution in 
this vein is Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), who 
document commitment demand in the form of 
meaningful, costly deadlines. Though compel-
ling, this, as well, should be viewed as a pre-
diction of dynamic inconsistency, as opposed to 
dynamic inconsistency itself. Recent advances 
have provided links between changing patience 
or dynamic inconsistency and commitment 
demand (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006; Kaur, 
Kremer, and Mullainathan 2014; Augenblick, 
Niederle, and Sprenger 2013). These findings 
limit the set of alternative explanations for either 
behavior and point compellingly toward models 
of dynamic inconsistency. Importantly, however, 
across exercises, the correlation can be low. For 
example, in Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger 
(2013) measures of dynamic inconsistency 
explain only about 5 percent of the variation in 
commitment demand.
III. A Future Perspective
In this brief review of the experimental liter-
ature on dynamic inconsistency, two points rise 
to prominence. First, the importance of inves-
tigating true dynamic inconsistencies. And 
second, the need to ensure that assumptions 
required for plausibly identifying preferences 
are satisfied.
There are many ways in which the exper-
imental literature on dynamic inconsistency 
may evolve. I note two potential avenues. First, 
though monetary discounting experiments suf-
fer from clear confounds and have been called 
into question recently, the resulting parameter 
estimates at times link closely to relevant real-
world behaviors (see, e.g., Meier and Sprenger 
2010, 2012). These findings suggest that 
 monetary measures may indeed capture an ele-
ment of preferences in some contexts. As such, a 
valuable research question may be “Who treats 
money like consumption, and when?” Second, 
only a small body of literature correlates 
dynamic inconsistency to commitment demand. 
Such a correlation is critical for evaluating and 
discerning between models of dynamic incon-
sistency. A key input to such exercises is the 
relationship between behavior (dynamic incon-
sistency) and beliefs (sophistication). To date 
little is known empirically about the dimensions 
of this relationship except that it is likely weakly 
positive in the few observed cases. Critical con-
tributions remain for tracing out this relationship 
as the key policy prescription for dynamically 
inconsistent models rests on whether individu-
als with inconsistent preferences recognize their 
inconsistencies.
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